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BARRETT v. ROSENTHAL:
OH, WHAT A TANGLED WEB WE WEAVE -
NO LIABILITY FOR WEB DEFAMATION
TERNISHA MILES*
INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web has proven to be the ultimate form of mass
communication, solicitation, and entertainment. It reaches beyond
cultural and language barriers to affect every facet of our global soci-
ety. Not surprisingly, the Internet's reach has spread to the area of
civil litigation and has affected the applicability of defamation1 claims
brought against Internet service providers (hereinafter ISP) and In-
ternet users2.
In recent years, state and federal courts have wrestled with the tort
of defamation and its place in cyberspace. Generally, these cases have
involved claims brought by a private citizen against an ISP, where an
anonymous third party had posted defamatory statements on the pro-
vider's bulletin board or message board.' On this issue, adjudicating
courts have overwhelmingly4 ruled that the Communication and De-
cency Act of 19961 (hereinafter CDA) prohibits the imposition of lia-
bility for defamation on an ISP under these circumstances. These
cases, however, have not answered the question of whether a private
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, North Carolina Central University School of Law, Executive Edi-
tor for the 2007-2008 North Carolina Central Law Journal; B.A., LaGrange College, 2003;
MSIR., Troy University, 2004. Special thanks to Associate Dean David Green, Professor Don-
ald Corbett and Professor Nichelle Perry. Your instruction, advice and encouragement have
been invaluable. Thank you to my parents, grandmother, siblings and friends for your continued
love and support during my law school tenure.
1. Defamation is divided into two categories: libel and slander. Slander is generally spo-
ken and libel is generally written. However, courts have determined that where the publication
is in permanent form, such publication will be considered libel. See Matherson v. Marchello, 473
N.Y.S.2d 998, 1003 (1984). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 786-87 (5th ed.
1984); SALMOND & HEUSTON, LAW OF TORTS 143-44 (20th ed. 1992) (explaining the distinction
between libel and slander).
2. "Users" as interpreted by Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526 (Cal. 2006), refers to
person or entity who uses an interactive computer service.
3. Title 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006), defines "information content provider" as any person
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
4. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Lunney v. Prodigy
Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (1999).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
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individual who uses an online chat room, blog site, bulletin board, dis-
cussion room or other forum for communication on the Internet can
be held liable for defamatory statements posted to these forums. Un-
til the decision handed down in Barrett v. Rosenthal, there was a small
window for the basis of user liability.6 After the majority's opinion in
Barrett, the California Supreme Court may have forever closed that
window for plaintiffs who have been defamed on the World Wide
Web.7 On November 20, 2006, the California Supreme Court ruled
that the co-plaintiff in the Barrett case, Dr. Polevoy, did not have an
actionable claim for defamation pursuant to the CDA because the de-
fendant, Rosenthal, was immune from liability for defamation as a
user under the CDA. 8
The Barrett decision is not binding on courts outside of California;
however, it will be interesting to see how other jurisdictions respond
to the ruling.9 Although many legal scholars feel that the application
of the CDA leaves a harsh result for plaintiffs whose reputation has
been injured by way of the Internet, this ruling may prove resilient for
years to come. The Barrett decision is significant not only in Califor-
nia, but in courts nationwide because it is the first case to state that
the publisher/distributor analysis normally attributable to secondary
publishers does not apply to an Internet user. 10 It also establishes for
the first time that private individuals can be protected under the
CDA." After all is said and done, the Barrett decision has completely
alleviated liability for defamation against Internet users and has left
injured plaintiffs with no means of recovery. 12
6. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526 (Cal. 2006).
7. Id. at 529 (holding that Internet users are immune from liability for republication of
statements known to be defamatory).
8. Id.
9. More specifically, it will be interesting to see how and if the Pennsylvania Courts apply
this precedent when deciding the defamation claim filed by Todd Hollis against
DontDateHimGirl.com and Tasha Joseph, the owner and operator of the website. Todd Hollis
alleged that his reputation was harmed by a user of the site when the user made a posting claim-
ing that he has herpes, fathered multiple children, and was homosexual. Todd Hollis further
alleged that Tasha Joseph published the information with knowledge of its falsity and that she
published such information with reckless disregard of the truth. See Carl Jones, Scorned Attor-
ney Sues Kiss-and-Tell Web Site, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, July 5, 2006, available at http://
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1151658319991.
10. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529. See generally RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:92
(2006) (explaining distinction between primary and secondary publishers).
11. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 526.
12. Id. Barrett may have been decided differently on the issue of whether Rosenthal com-
mitted libel when she made statements in e-mails and on Internet postings concerning Dr.
Stepen J. Barrett and Dr. Terry Polevoy in a jurisdiction that has not enacted an anti-SLAPP
(strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (1996). This stat-
ute provides, in part:
[A] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution
2
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BARRETT V. ROSENTHAL
THE CASE
Dr. Stephen J. Barrett and Dr. Terry Polevoy, plaintiffs in this case,
operated web sites for the purpose of exposing health care frauds. Il-
lena Rosenthal, defendant in this case, directed the Humantics Foun-
dation for Women and operated an Internet discussion group. Drs.
Barrett and Polevoy filed a suit against Rosenthal under the theory of
defamation, claiming that Rosenthal and other Internet users commit-
ted libel by maliciously distributing defamatory statements in e-mails
and Internet postings. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defen-
dant's posting affected the plaintiffs' reputation, competence, and
negatively impacted their efforts to combat fraud. The complaint filed
by the plaintiffs also stated that the defendant, Rosenthal, republished
various messages even after Dr. Barrett warned her that the messages
contained false and defamatory information. 3 The complaint alleged
that the following statements were posted on Rosenthal's discussion
group:
Dr. Barrett is arrogant, bizarre, close-minded; emotionally disturbed,
professionally incompetent, intellectually dishonest, a dishonest jour-
nalist, sleazy, unethical, a quack, a thug, a bully, a Nazi, a hired gun for
vested interests, the leader of a subversive organization, and engaged
in criminal activity.
Dr. Polevoy is dishonest, close-minded; emotionally disturbed; profes-
sionally incompetent, unethical, a quack, a fanatic, a Nazi, a hired gun
for vested interest, the leader of a subversive organization and en-
gaged in criminal activity and has made anti-Semitic remarks. 14
After the complaint was filed by the plaintiffs in a lower California
court, the defendant, Rosenthal, moved to strike the complaint under
the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) stat-
ute.' 5 She claimed that her statements were protected speech and ar-
gued that the plaintiffs could not establish a probability of prevailing
because she was immune under section 230(c)(1) of the CDA.16 The
lower court granted the motion, finding that Rosenthal's statements
concerned an issue of public interest within the scope of the anti-
SLAPP statute'7 and were not actionable because the statements con-
tained no provably false facts.' 8 The trial court found that the only
actionable statement was the statement made by Tim Bolen in an arti-
cle subtitled "Opinion by Tim Bolen." This article accused Dr.
in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. § 425.16 (b)(1).
13. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 514.
14. Id. at 514 n.2.
15. § 425.16.
16. Communication and Decency Act (CDA) 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
17. § 425.16.
18. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 514.
20071
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Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio producer. a9 Rosenthal posted a
portion of this article on two news groups devoted to alternative
health issues and the politics of medicine. However, she did not post
this article to her own discussion group. Although the lower court
found that the statements were facially actionable, it ruled that Rosen-
thal was immunized from liability for posting a portion of the article
written by Tim Bolen pursuant to section 230(c)(1) of the CDA.20
Barrett and Stephens appealed the order issued by the lower court
to the California Court of Appeal. The court vacated the order grant-
ing the motion to strike as applied to Dr. Polevoy. The court held that
section 230 of the CDA did not protect Rosenthal from liability as a
"distributor" under the common law of defamation, which would have
essentially allowed the claim to go forward.2" Rosenthal petitioned
the California Supreme Court for review of the appellate court's deci-
sion, and the court granted her petition.
BACKGROUND
The law of defamation has been a perplexing and confusing portion
of American jurisprudence since its entry into the law of torts. The
claim of defamation was implemented into the law of torts to protect
an individual's interest in not having his reputation tarnished by false
statements. 22 Defamation in its simplest form is "a publication with-
out justification or excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation
of another, by exposing him to shame and ridicule. '23 As articulated
by the court in Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal Inc., defama-
tory statements are words which tend to "expose one to public hatred,
shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, os-
tracism, degradation or disgrace ... and to deprive one of their confi-
dence and friendly intercourse in society. '24 From its various pleading
requirements 25 to the privileges 26 that work to defeat the claim, the
law of defamation has proved to be challenging and ever-evolving.
With the excessive societal craze with global interaction on the World
19. Id.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
21. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 518-19. A distributor is generally referred to as a secondary pub-
lisher. See RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:92 (2006).
22. See PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984); SALMOND & HEUSTON,
LAW OF TORTS 143-44 (20th ed. 1992).
23. Parmiter v. Coupland, 151 Eng. Rep. 340 (1840), cited in PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF
TORTS 773 n.17 (5th ed. 1984).
24. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1993).
25. Depending on the status of the plaintiff (private citizen, limited and general public fig-
ure, and public official) at the pleading stage the plaintiff must allege that the defendant pub-
lished the information with malice or reckless disregard of the truth or that the defendant
negligently published the statements; See New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975); Getz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4
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Wide Web and its many forms of communication, the tort of defama-
tion in the 21st century has taken on new characteristics. Not surpris-
ingly, these new characteristics bring more complexity to the
application of defamation and have thwarted relief that was once
guaranteed to plaintiffs who could prove the basic elements of
defamation.27
In order to understand the significance of the ruling in Barrett, it is
necessary to understand the distinction between the common law ap-
proach to republication of defamatory statements and the immunity
allowed for republication under the CDA. At common law, before
ruling on liability, courts would determine whether the individual re-
publishing such statements knew or had reason to know of the state-
ments' defamatory character.28 This analysis is generally referred to
as secondary publisher liability or distributor liability. A primary pub-
lisher is defined as the individual who or entity that has created or
originally published the defamatory statements.29 Entities or individ-
uals wearing the primary publisher label are subject to liability for the
defamatory material regardless of whether they knew of the defama-
tory meaning.3 ° Primary publishers generally include newspapers,
book publishers, radio stations and television networks.31 Secondary
publishers, on the other hand, generally include bookstores, libraries,
and other distributors of information that do not otherwise participate
in the initial creation, editing, or publishing of the material.32 The
common law requirement of knowledge on the part of a secondary
publisher has been instrumental in finding liability for those secondary
publishers who know or have reason to know of a publication's de-
famatory character. However, with the implementation of the CDA,
such liability has been eradicated for secondary publishers using the
Internet as the vehicle for defamation.33
The CDA provides that "no provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any infor-
26. There are three basic privileges or defenses to defamation: Truth, Absolute Privilege,
and Qualified Privilege. See PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984); SALMOND
& HEUSTON, LAW OF TORTS 143-44 (20th ed. 1992).
27. The elements of defamation are: (1) a communication; (2) to a third party; (3) the third
party knows at the time of the statement or discovers within a reasonable time the defamatory
meaning; (4) of and concerning the plaintiff; and (5) lowers the reputation of the plaintiff in the
estimation of the community. See Denny v. Mertz 267 N.W.2d 304 (1978); Giaimo v. Literary
Guild, 434 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1981).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977); see also Wright v. Bachmurski, 29
P.3d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
29. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 44 at 232-33 (1978).
30. Id.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(2) (1977).
32. Id. § 581.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
2007]
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mation provided by another information content provider."34 It is a
well-settled aspect of the CDA that ISPs are completely immunized
from liability for defamation suits even where such providers monitor
or edit material posted on the web.3" The CDA is a very broad and
drastic Congressional enactment, made in response to a New York
Supreme Court holding in 1995. In Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy
Services,3 6 the court held that an online computer service provider
could be held responsible for libelous statements made by an anony-
mous poster even if the provider was unaware of the statements.37 In
Stratton Oakmont Inc., an anonymous user of the service's "Money
Talk" bulletin board posted statements alleging that a securities in-
vestment banking firm and its president committed criminal and
fraudulent acts in connection with an initial public offering of stock.38
The statement went on to say that the banking firm was a "cult of
brokers who either lie for a living or get fired."39 The court decided
this case by relying on the primary/secondary publisher analysis. The
primary/secondary publisher analysis required the court to determine
whether the service (1) merely distributed the posted comments or (2)
exercised sufficient control over the bulletin board to render it a pub-
lisher.4" The court reasoned that the service exercised substantial con-
trol over the bulletin board and therefore was not a mere distributor
entitled to the protection afforded to secondary publishers such as li-
braries, book stores, and other distributors.41 The court reached this
conclusion because the service held itself out to the public and its
members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin board and
therefore was not a secondary publisher, but rather a primary pub-
lisher.42 In making a "conscious choice" to regulate the content of its
bulletin boards, the service exposed itself to greater liability than
other computer networks that did not so choose.43
34. Id. § 230(c)(1) (The CDA defines "Interactive Computer Service" as any information
service, system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer sever, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
"Information Content Provider" is defined as any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.).
35. See Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Lunney v. Prodigy
Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (1999).
36. Stratton Oakmont Inc., v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995),
reargument denied, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
6
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The decision reached in Stratton Oakmont Inc. became the basis of
attack and led Congress to enact the CDA.44 The policy behind the
enactment of the CDA, as established in section 230(b), is to promote
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive com-
puter services, preserve the free market that presently exists for the
Internet, offer a forum of true diversity of political discourse, as well
as encourage service providers to monitor and remove "obscene,"
"lewd," "filthy," and indecent postings on its bulletin boards, chat
rooms, and other forums of communication.45 With the implementa-
tion of the CDA, many other legal questions concerning defamation
have come to the forefront; specifically, whether a mere individual can
be considered a user in order to enjoy the immunity that is afforded to
ISPs. With the ruling handed down in Barrett, those questions have
been answered in the affirmative.46
ANALYSIS
The Barrett court reached its conclusion by relying on the statutory
interpretation of the CDA and on prior case law, which extended im-
munity to ISPs.47 The issues presented on appeal were whether Ro-
senthal should be granted immunity as a distributor pursuant to
section 230 of the CDA,48 and whether a user is entitled to immunity
if a user engages in active rather than passive conduct.49 The trial
court ruled that Rosenthal's action of republishing an article written
by Tim Bolen was not actionable pursuant to section 230 of the
CDA.50 The California Court of Appeal vacated the order granting
the motion to strike the complaint.51 The court of appeal ruled that
section 230 of the CDA did not protect Rosenthal from liability as a
"distributor" under the common law of defamation. The California
Supreme Court granted Rosenthal's petition for review and ruled that
section 230 of the CDA was a Congressional effort to prohibit liability
for Internet providers and users for information created or developed
through the Internet. The court held that section 230(c)(1) of the
CDA immunizes individual users of interactive5 2 computer services,
and that no practical or principled distinction can be drawn between
active and passive use.53
44. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1996).
45. Id.
46. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006)
47. Id. at 513.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 203.
49. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 513.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
53. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 513.
2007]
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The court began its analysis with an overview of the Zeran v. Ameri-
can Online Inc. decision. In Zeran, an impostor posted messages
anonymously on the service's bulletin board advertising T-shirts with
tasteless slogans concerning a bombing of a federal building that had
occurred a few days before the posting.5 4 The plaintiff brought an
action against America Online Inc., claiming that the ISP unreasona-
bly delayed removing an anonymous defamatory statement about
Zeran from its bulletin boards, refused to post a retraction of the
statements, and failed to monitor its message boards for similar de-
famatory messages thereafter." The Zeran court recognized that
Congress intended to avoid the undue burden that would be imposed
on ISPs if they were required to monitor and remove messages posted
to their message and bulletin boards. The Zeran court noted that
while original posters of defamatory speech do not escape accounta-
bility for defamatory statements concerning a plaintiff, Congress
"made a policy choice not to deter harmful online speech by imposing
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other par-
ties' potentially injurious messages."56 The Zeran court further articu-
lated that section 230(c)(1) of the CDA reflected the policy concern
that if ISPs faced tort liability for republished messages on the In-
ternet, they might choose to severely restrict the number and the type
of messages posted.57
Relying on legislative history, the Zeran court quickly noted that
the very purpose for the implementation of section 230 of the CDA
was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination
of offensive material over their services.58 If liability were imposed on
these companies, the Zeran court argued, there would be no incentive
for ISPs to monitor and remove potentially defamatory or offensive
statements posted to its message boards.59 Liability of this nature, the
Zeran court argued, would defeat the purpose of the CDA's passage.6 °
The plaintiff in Zeran argued that since the statute did not directly
speak to whether a distributor would be entitled to the same immunity
afforded to a publisher, the common law rule should prevail.61 More
specifically, an ISP should be found liable for defamation if it knew or
had reason to know of the defamatory statements posted to its discus-
sion forum. Despite his argument, the Zeran court reasoned that
54. Id. at 515 (discussing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29).
55. Id. at 515-16.
56. Id. at 516 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31).
57. Id. at 516 (discussing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
8
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Congress had spoken directly to this issue by employing the term
"publisher," and that preserving distributor liability would defeat the
primary purposes of section 230 of the CDA.62 The Zeran court fur-
ther stated that the policy of strictly construing statutes in derogation
of the common law did not require a literal interpretation conflicting
with the obvious legislative purpose.63 This analysis allowed the
Zeran court to hold that the common law distributor analysis had no
impact on section 230 of the CDA and could not defeat the broad
scope of the immunity extended by the act.
In Barrett, the California Supreme Court also reviewed the opinion
entered by the California Court of Appeal. The court of appeal opin-
ion declined to follow the rule of law established by the Zeran court.6 4
It asserted that the Zeran court had created a more expansive immu-
nity guarantee than was necessary, which would actually defeat the
goal of encouraging self-regulation among ISPs. 65 The California Su-
preme Court noted that the court of appeal focused on three factors in
determining whether immunity, under section 230 of the CDA, should
be extended to Rosenthal: (1) the Zeran court's interpretation of the
statutory term "publisher;" (2) the legislative history of section 230 of
the CDA; and (3) the practical implications of notice liability in the
Internet environment.66 The court of appeal took the view that the
term publisher was ambiguous, because it might refer to primary pub-
lishers and distributors.67 The court of appeal argued that such a "le-
gally uncertain word" could not support the broad immunity that the
Zeran court derived from the statute. 68 The court of appeal also ar-
ticulated that it was "reasonable to assume" that Congress had in
mind the different standards of common law liability imposed on "pri-
mary publishers. '69 Thus, the omission of any reference to "distribu-
tors" in section 230(c)(1) of the CDA was intentional.7 ° The court of
appeal also reasoned that Congress did not intend to provide blanket
protection for cases of this nature.71 Instead, it argued that in section
230(c)(2) of the CDA Congress intended only to immunize providers
and users against liability for "any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or
62. Id. at 517 (discussing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332).
63. Id. at 517-18 (discussing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333-34).
64. Id. at 518.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 518-26.
67. Id. at 519.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 518-19.
70. Id. at 519.
71. Id.
2007]
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user considers to be . . . objectionable. '7 2 The court of appeal also
attempted to compare the CDA with the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (hereinafter DMCA),73 enacted in 1998, for additional sup-
port for limiting the scope of the term "publisher". It stated that the
DMCA immunized ISPs from liability for copyright infringement and
acting expeditiously to remove copyrighted material upon notice. It
reasoned that Congress specifically included such detailed notice re-
quirements and procedures for replacement of the disputed material
upon sufficient counter-notification. 74 The court of appeal also rea-
soned that because Congress did not include such specific regulations
of notice liability in the CDA, Congress intended to preserve the com-
mon law distinction between publishers and distributors,75 thus mak-
ing Rosenthal liable if she knew or had reason to know that Tim
Bolen's article contained libelous statements regarding the plaintiff.
The California Supreme Court sided with the Zeran court rather
than the California Court of Appeal. The court stated that the Zeran
court appropriately construed the meaning of "publisher," claiming
that there was little reason to believe Congress felt it necessary to
address publishers and distributors separately.76 The court reasoned
that the court of appeal "failed to respond to the Zeran court's point
that once online distributors are notified of defamatory content, they
are placed in a position traditionally occupied by publishers, and must
make an editorial decision on how to treat the posted material. '77
The court stated that this was the reason why Congress did not distin-
guish between the terms "publisher" and "distributor. '78
The court also disregarded the court of appeal's reasoning that a
broad reading of section 230(c)(1) of the CDA would make section
230(c)(2) of the CDA unnecessary. It stated that "these provisions
address different concerns. Section 230(c)(1) is concerned with liabil-
ity arising from information provided online. ' 79 This section provides
immunity from claims by those offended by an online publication
while "[s]ection 230(c)(2) is directed at actions taken by Internet ser-
vice providers or users to restrict access to online information. '80
The court also stated that "[t]he Court of Appeal's reference to the
DMCA does not support its conclusion that Congress's use of the
72. Id.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
74. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 519.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 519.
80. Id. at 520.
10
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term 'publisher' was insufficient to abrogate 'distributor' liability." 81
It further reasoned that "Congress crafted a limited immunity.., with
specific provision[s], [and t]he fact that it did not do so in the CDA...
supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit notice
liability under the CDA."82
After the court dispensed with addressing the flaws within the court
of appeal decision that led to a different outcome than in Zeran, the
court decided the definition of "user. ' 83 The court recognized the def-
inition of "user" was not included in the statute, thus to determine its
meaning in the context of the statute, the court relied on the interpre-
tation of the statute with legislative history. The court established that
"[u]ser plainly refers to someone who uses something and the statu-
tory context makes it clear that Congress simply meant someone who
uses an interactive computer service."84 The court stated "that Con-
gress in Section (b)(3) consistently referred to 'users' of interactive
computer services as individuals, thus there is no reason to suppose
that Congress attached a different meaning in Section (c)(1). ' 85 "Ro-
senthal used the Internet to gain access to newsgroups where she
posted [the alleged defamatory article]." 86 She was a "user" in the
simplest form of the word,87 and thus was entitled to the immunity
granted under section 230(c)(1) of the CDA. The plaintiffs contended
that even though Rosenthal was a user, she was an active user and
therefore was not eligible for immunity. The plaintiffs further argued
that the immunity extended to users and ISPs was for the "protection
of 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material
88
and such immunity was not intended for those persons who actively
engage in posting defamatory material on the Internet. To this argu-
ment the court responded that because Rosenthal made no changes in
the article she republished on the newsgroups, the court did not have
to consider whether she was an active or passive user.89 However, the
court acknowledged that the issue of active and passive use was deter-
mined in Batzel v. Smith.9 0 In Batzel, the defendant sent e-mail to the
operator of a web site, with some changes, and distributed it to the
subscribers of his e-mail newsletter. 91 Batzel sued Smith and the op-
81. Id. at 520.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 526.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 526 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)).
86. Id. at 527.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 527 n.19.
90. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir 2003).
91. Id. at 1031.
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erator for defamation, and the trial court denied the motion to strike
the complaint. The court stated that although the theory was a viable
one under California law, "Polevoy does not assert it in this case."92
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant Rosenthal
and others similarly situated are immune from defamation liability
under the section 230 of the CDA based on the interpretation of the
word "user." Such a determination, the court noted, did not require
an inquiry into whether the user is active or passive if no facts are
present to suggest that the user edited or changed the information in
any form.
CONCLUSION
On November 6, 2006, the California Supreme Court established
with great detail that an individual user was, in fact, immune from
liability for defamation under section 230 of the CDA, without inquiry
into the common law primary/secondary publisher analysis. This
broad interpretation of the CDA may not be consistent with legisla-
tive purpose and Congress may not have intended to completely im-
munize private individuals from liability. However, if there is any
change to be made to this drastic law it must come from the legisla-
ture; where the California courts "giveth" the legislature "taketh"
away. If Barrett is accepted by all jurisdictions, like Zeran, individuals
will have no recourse for defamatory statements made on the World
Wide Web.
92. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 528 n.20.
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